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Yuval Noah Harari is a lecturer at the Department of History of the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He specializes in medieval and early
modern warfare, and in the cultural history of war.
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How did you
become interested in medieval special operations? |
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Like many other historians, I suffer from “Presentism”, which means
that events in the present tend to color the way I see the past. In the
last few years special operations came to dominate the wars raging in
and around my own country. Consequently as I was reading medieval
chronicles and documents my attention was drawn to events of a similar
nature. At some stage I realized that they constituted a crucial part of
medieval warfare, which has so far been neglected by scholars. On a more
personal level, I have found that studying the history of a disturbing
present-day phenomenon is a good way to gain perspective on it and go
beyond easy labeling such as “terrorism” or “judicial killing”.
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How did your
personal experience influence your understanding of medieval
special operations? |
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When studying special operations, it is all too easy to be
caught up by a blind spirit of enthusiasm, and end up
writing admiring accounts of daring escapades. Thanks to the
events of the last few years in my country, I was able to
approach the subject with (hopefully) a more somber attitude. I tried to keep in mind the politics behind the
bravery, and the catastrophes that misplaced daring can produce.
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Did the study
of medieval special operations teach you anything about
present day special operations? |
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It is a question of attitude more than of clear-cut
conclusions. For example, by studying medieval examples I
realized that assassination and abduction are standard
military tools with a very long pedigree, and that they
should be studied and weighed just like other military
tools. It is tempting to treat the subject as taboo, and
refuse to even think about it. From 1976 US Government
employees are officially barred from conspiring political
assassinations, though at the same time they have laid
calculated plans for the nuclear annihilation of the entire
human race (and unofficially assassinated quite a number of
leaders). The assassination campaign orchestrated by the
Syrians in Lebanon, or by the Israelis in Gaza, draws a lot
of criticism from countries responsible for far more deaths
of ordinary civilians. Perhaps – just perhaps – there is
something to be said for the view Thomas More expressed in
1516 in Utopia. More’s Utopians prefer to wage war by having the enemy
leaders assassinated or kidnapped. More acknowledges that such a way of
warfare is often considered mean and cruel, but, he writes, ‘the
Utopians are very proud of it. They say it is extremely sensible to
dispose of major wars like this without fighting a single battle, and
also most humane to save thousands of innocent lives at the cost of a
few guilty ones’. |
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How similar or
different are medieval and late modern special operations?
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Generally speaking, there is more similarity than
difference. Not only in the methods used, but also in the
cultural attitude to these operations. In both eras, special
operations have been viewed with a mixture of fascination
and repulsion. They occasionally manifest the dominant
cultural ideals better than any other form of warfare (for
example, when knights rescued their lords from prison, or
when today’s special forces rescue civilian hostages). On
other occasions special operations violate the dominant
cultural ideals in the most shocking manner (whence they are labeled “treachery” or “terror”). The main
difference between the eras is the place of technology. Technology
played a very minor role in medieval special operations. |
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Was chivalry
and its ideals just a fiction? |
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No. Medieval warfare was characterized by the tension
between chivalric considerations and instrumental
considerations. Occasionally, instrumental considerations
carried the day, especially in special operations. However,
very often the opposite was the case. Though in a feudal
world assassination was probably the most cost-effective way
of waging war, it was used much less often than purely
instrumental considerations would have dictated. The
ultimate aims of war were themselves defined in chivalric
terms and dependant upon chivalric culture, so that too much
foul play could empty victory of its meaning.
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Many people,
and even scholars, tend to think of treachery, foul play,
and assassination as “eastern” ways of war, contrasted to
the “fair play” of European and western warfare. Does your
study support this view? |
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Not really. If you read the book, you will find it crammed
with foul play “made in Europe”. It is true that cultures of
war and methods of warfare may differ between different
areas and eras. For instance, during the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, assassination of rulers was probably
more widespread in the Middle East than in Western Europe.
This is one of the reasons why European monarchies and
political entities were more stable. But any crude division
between east and west is misleading. During the fifteenth
century the chances of an Italian, English or Scottish
prince to fall victim to an assassin’s dagger or to a
poisoned dish were probably higher than anywhere else in the
world. |
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