Yuval Noah Harari is a lecturer at the Department of History of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He specializes in medieval and early modern warfare, and in the cultural history of war.
 

How did you become interested in medieval special operations?
   

Like many other historians, I suffer from “Presentism”, which means that events in the present tend to color the way I see the past. In the last few years special operations came to dominate the wars raging in and around my own country. Consequently as I was reading medieval chronicles and documents my attention was drawn to events of a similar nature. At some stage I realized that they constituted a crucial part of medieval warfare, which has so far been neglected by scholars. On a more personal level, I have found that studying the history of a disturbing present-day phenomenon is a good way to gain perspective on it and go beyond easy labeling such as “terrorism” or “judicial killing”.

   
How did your personal experience influence your understanding of medieval special operations?
   

When studying special operations, it is all too easy to be caught up by a blind spirit of enthusiasm, and end up writing admiring accounts of daring escapades. Thanks to the events of the last few years in my country, I was able to approach the subject with (hopefully) a more somber attitude. I tried to keep in mind the politics behind the bravery, and the catastrophes that misplaced daring can produce.

   
Did the study of medieval special operations teach you anything about present day special operations?
   

It is a question of attitude more than of clear-cut conclusions. For example, by studying medieval examples I realized that assassination and abduction are standard military tools with a very long pedigree, and that they should be studied and weighed just like other military tools. It is tempting to treat the subject as taboo, and refuse to even think about it. From 1976 US Government employees are officially barred from conspiring political assassinations, though at the same time they have laid calculated plans for the nuclear annihilation of the entire human race (and unofficially assassinated quite a number of leaders). The assassination campaign orchestrated by the Syrians in Lebanon, or by the Israelis in Gaza, draws a lot of criticism from countries responsible for far more deaths of ordinary civilians. Perhaps – just perhaps – there is something to be said for the view Thomas More expressed in 1516 in Utopia. More’s Utopians prefer to wage war by having the enemy leaders assassinated or kidnapped. More acknowledges that such a way of warfare is often considered mean and cruel, but, he writes, ‘the Utopians are very proud of it. They say it is extremely sensible to dispose of major wars like this without fighting a single battle, and also most humane to save thousands of innocent lives at the cost of a few guilty ones’.

   
How similar or different are medieval and late modern special operations?
   

Generally speaking, there is more similarity than difference. Not only in the methods used, but also in the cultural attitude to these operations. In both eras, special operations have been viewed with a mixture of fascination and repulsion. They occasionally manifest the dominant cultural ideals better than any other form of warfare (for example, when knights rescued their lords from prison, or when today’s special forces rescue civilian hostages). On other occasions special operations violate the dominant cultural ideals in the most shocking manner (whence they are labeled “treachery” or “terror”). The main difference between the eras is the place of technology. Technology played a very minor role in medieval special operations.

   
Was chivalry and its ideals just a fiction?
   

No. Medieval warfare was characterized by the tension between chivalric considerations and instrumental considerations. Occasionally, instrumental considerations carried the day, especially in special operations. However, very often the opposite was the case. Though in a feudal world assassination was probably the most cost-effective way of waging war, it was used much less often than purely instrumental considerations would have dictated. The ultimate aims of war were themselves defined in chivalric terms and dependant upon chivalric culture, so that too much foul play could empty victory of its meaning.

   
Many people, and even scholars, tend to think of treachery, foul play, and assassination as “eastern” ways of war, contrasted to the “fair play” of European and western warfare. Does your study support this view?
   

Not really. If you read the book, you will find it crammed with foul play “made in Europe”. It is true that cultures of war and methods of warfare may differ between different areas and eras. For instance, during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, assassination of rulers was probably more widespread in the Middle East than in Western Europe. This is one of the reasons why European monarchies and political entities were more stable. But any crude division between east and west is misleading. During the fifteenth century the chances of an Italian, English or Scottish prince to fall victim to an assassin’s dagger or to a poisoned dish were probably higher than anywhere else in the world.

   

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